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In a subjective  claims  problem  agents  have  conﬂicting  perceptions  on  what constitutes
a  fair  division  of  a  jointly  produced  cake.  In a large-scale  experimental  study  involving  a
three-agent  subjective  claims  problem,  we compare  the  performance  of four  mechanisms
which  use  agents’  reports  on fair  shares  as input  and  yield  a division  of the  cake  (or less)
as  output.  The  mechanisms  differ  with  respect  to the  desirable  properties  they  possess  and
they  are  compared  in  terms  of efﬁciency  and  perceived  allocative  and  procedural  fairness.
Successful  in terms  of both  fairness  and  efﬁciency  are  two  mechanisms  that explicitly  ask
for  an  assessment  of the  partners’  fair  shares  and  that  do not  induce  agents  to  exaggerate
their assessment  of  the own  fair share.  One  of  the  two  successful  mechanisms  does  not  ask
for an  assessment  of the  own  fair share  while  the  other  punishes  overly  selﬁsh  own  claims.
©  2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the
CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
. Introduction
In the oil and gas industry, a single oil pool often underlies the land parcels of several owners. If owners act non-
ooperatively, each drilling his own well, oil reserves are depleted at an excessive rate, resulting in large efﬁciency losses
see Libecap and Wiggins, 1984). An obvious solution to this ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem is unitization, that is, treating
he oil pool as a production unit controlled by a single ﬁrm. Unitization, however, brings in the new problem of how the
roceeds of the oil ﬁeld should be divided among the multiple owners. Due to physical characteristics of oil and gas deposits,
ndividual contributions to the joint proﬁt are difﬁcult to compare.1 As a result, parties typically have conﬂicting subjective
erceptions about the relative contribution of their own  property to the joint proﬁt and thus also about what constitutes a
air allocation.2 An important question then is how to aggregate these conﬂicting subjective perceptions into a fair division
f the joint proﬁt.
 We would like to thank the co-editor Marie-Claire Villeval and two  anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions. We also
hank seminar participants at Theem Kreuzlingen, Bilkent University, ESA and GfEW Meetings and, in particular, Shyam Sunder for useful suggestions and
omments. This project was supported by funds of the Austrian National Bank (OeNB Anniversary Fund, grant number: 13595) and the Austrian Science Fund
FWF,  grant number: P 22669-G11).
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Economics, University of Innsbruck, Universitätsstr. 15, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria.
E-mail address: rudolf.kerschbamer@uibk.ac.at (R. Kerschbamer).
1 For example, a simple division according to the size of contributed land might be considered unfair, since some parcels are located over the centre of
he  oil ﬁeld while others are located in the periphery (see Cramer et al., 2009).
2 Indeed, conﬂicting subjective perceptions about what constitutes a fair allocation of the joint proﬁt and the resulting failure of negotiations about
nitization has led major oil producing states in the US to provide legal mechanisms by which an oil pool can be unitized with less than unanimous consent
f  the right owners. See, for example, Rule 530 in Colodrado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.019
167-2681/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
icenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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The motivation for the present study came from another example where parties’ contributions to a joint surplus are
difﬁcult to compare: In Tyrol, Austria, a new water power plant will be built in a location that has common borders with
three municipalities. The company who owns and operates the power plant pays a certain amount of money to the three
municipalities in exchange for the right to use land (i.e. the valley that would need to be ﬂooded in order to operate the power
plant) and water. The amount to be paid is no longer an issue as the decision to build the plant has already been made.3 Now
the municipalities have to decide how to distribute the money amongst themselves, and the question arises what would be
the fair share for each of them. The question is non-trivial because the municipalities give up different amounts of land and
water rights, and it is unclear how land and water should be evaluated on a common scale.
In order to evaluate fair shares, one could consider estimating the contribution of a given partner by removing him from
the partnership. However, the market values of the individual rights are fairly small compared to the combined value of the
resources. Hence, this procedure of estimating the contribution of a partner is of limited help. Another way  of resolving the
division problem would be to ask an outside observer as impartial arbitrator to assign shares to the prospective partners.
However, such an external agent is typically in a worse position to discern the partners’ relative contributions and their
fairness perceptions than the partners are themselves, as his information might be incomplete, or biased if provided from
the partners’ side. The partners may  thus prefer to rely on their own subjective perceptions on how the proﬁt should be
divided fairly and they may  ﬁnd it useful to use a rule or procedure to reach a consensus. The obvious question then is
which rule this should be. The present paper investigates this question by comparing in a large-scale experimental study
with more than 600 participants the performance of different cake division mechanisms for a subjective claims problem
involving three agents. The three-agent case is actually relevant in practice and it has some special features that disappear
when there are four or more agents (see the discussion below).
Our two motivating examples incorporate two  different sources for the inefﬁciency of the non-cooperative solution: In
the petroleum-industry example the inefﬁciency is due to the over-exploration of the joint resource, as captured in the
familiar ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem: Multiple owners are each endowed with the right to use the common resource,
and no one has the right to exclude anybody. By contrast, in the power plant example the source of the inefﬁciency is the
under-exploration of the common resource due to what Heller (1998) has termed the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ problem:
Multiple owners of inputs are each endowed with the right to block their coordinated use, and inputs are almost useless
individually.
Our aim is to take a unifying approach for the study of such problems by focusing on their similarities, which are the
subjective perceptions of involved parties’ fair shares of the common resource and the inefﬁciency of the non-cooperative
solution. To this aim, a stylized version of the problem, which shall be referred to as the subjective claims problem, is formulated
as follows: Several agents – the partners – have contributed inputs with a stand-alone value of zero to a joint project whose
ﬁnal value is a ﬁxed sum of money denoted by S.4 Once S is produced, the partners have to divide it amongst themselves.
Since inputs are difﬁcult to compare, partners typically have conﬂicting subjective perceptions about what constitutes a
fair division of the joint proﬁt. In the following, we  shall refer to an allocation of S that is considered fair by partner i as
her subjective evaluation of claims.  In the case of n partners such a subjective evaluation of claims is a vector with n entries
summing up to S.5 This formulation implicitly assumes that the partners are interested not only in their own material payoff
or share of S, but also in the fairness of the allocation. The subjective claims problem is then to ﬁnd an allocation s = (s1, . . . sn),
where
∑
isi ≤ S, or alternatively, a procedure that implements such an allocation, which is considered fair by the partners
and which is also efﬁcient.
The present paper compares in a large-scale lab experiment the performance of different cake division mechanisms in
a subjective claims problem involving three agents. The mechanisms use agents’ reports on fair shares as input and yield a
division of the cake (or less) as output.6 The mechanisms differ with respect to the desirable properties they possess.
Economic theorists have identiﬁed several desiderata a cake division mechanism might or might not possess. An obvious
minimum requirement is consensuality: If there is a way  to divide the cake that agrees with all individual reports then
this should be the outcome. A further desirable property is that the rule should not induce agents to exaggerate the own
fair share. One way to achieve this is not to ask the agents for an assessment of the own fair share. This property is called
impartiality.7
3 The fact that the municipalities agreed to give up their resources at a point in time where they did not know what each of them gets in exchange might
seem  strange to an economist. But this is exactly what happened in this case.
4 While in the examples above the combined value of the inputs is worth much more than the sum of the stand-alone values, each input still has some
value  individually. We  abstract from positive stand-alone values for the sake of simplicity.
5 In contrast to the n privately known vectors of subjective claims described here, the more familiar objective claims (or bankruptcy) problem refers to
one  publicly known vector of objective claims, which is infeasible because the sum of the objective claims exceeds the available amount. See Moulin (2002)
and Thomson (2003) for surveys, and Gächter and Riedl (2005, 2006) for experiments on the objective claims problem.
6 Bargaining may be another way  to obtain a solution to the subjective claims problem – see Karagözoglu and Riedl (2015) for an application in a related
context. In an additional part of our experiment, we  also investigated the performance of various unanimity bargaining procedures (one procedure per
session). Due to the large amount of data we obtained, we report here only the comparison of the static mechanisms. The performance of the unanimity
bargaining procedures is discussed in our companion paper (Gantner et al., 2013).
7 Impartiality combines objectivity, which requires that the implemented allocation does not depend on any partner’s statement about what he deserves
relative to the others, and strategy-proofness, which requires that no partner is able to affect his own share by the input that he provides.
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The Impartial Division Rule proposed by DeClippel et al. (2008) is a rule that satisﬁes both, consensuality and impartiality.
t does so by asking each partner only for an assessment of the relative claims of the other two  partners and by implementing
n allocation that is consistent with these relative shares if such an allocation exists. DeClippel, Moulin and Tideman show
hat for the case of three agents the Impartial Division Rule is the only direct mechanism that satisﬁes consensuality and
mpartiality. Thus, by investigating the performance of this mechanism we  can address the question whether consensuality
nd impartiality are actually desirable properties. A downside of the Impartial Division Rule for the three-agent case is that if
here is no division that is consistent with the reported opinions about relative fair shares then the rule divides less than the
otal amount available. This results in an inefﬁciency that increases in the degree of inconsistency of the reported relative
hares.8 This allows us to determine the efﬁciency cost of requiring impartiality and consensuality and to see who  pays this
ost. This is done by comparing the Impartial Division Rule to other mechanisms that may  reduce inefﬁciency but are not
mpartial and consensual. For our main comparisons, we selected two  other mechanisms that have in common that they
eplace impartiality by a punishment of overly greedy assessments of the own  fair share.
The Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule (Mumy,  1981) asks each partner only for an assessment of the own  fair share. If the sum
f reported ‘own claims’ does not exceed S, each partner receives the reported own claim. Otherwise each partner receives
he own claim minus a penalty that is a multiple, greater than 1, of the difference between the sum of reported own claims
nd the amount available. Thus, this mechanism potentially has two sources for inefﬁciency: One arises when the sum of
eported own claims exceeds S, while the other arises when this sum falls short of S. In comparison to the Impartial Division
ule, this mechanism imposes a larger punishment in case of disagreement of the reports, thus giving a higher incentive
or coordination of reports. Thus, the comparison to the Impartial Division Rule potentially gives information about the
onsequences of forcing agents to coordinate (by increasing the punishment when they do not do it) instead of requiring
mpartiality.
Both the Impartial Division Rule and the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule distribute less than the value of S if reports are
nconsistent. The third mechanism in our comparison has only an efﬁciency cost if reports are overly ‘prudent’: The Extended
ivide-the-Dollar Rule (Brams and Taylor, 1994) asks each partner to report an evaluation of the own claim as well as the
artners’ claims. If the three own claims sum up to S or less, each partner receives the reported evaluation of the own  claim.
therwise, own claims are paid out sequentially up to the point where S is depleted, giving priority in the order of ‘greed
evels’, starting with the lowest one. To calculate a partner’s greed level, the mechanism subtracts the average of the claims
ssigned to this partner by the other two members of the partnership from the reported own claim. If this difference is
ositive, the partner is greedy and the difference is his greed level. The only source for inefﬁciencies under this mechanism
re own claims that sum up to less than the value of the cake. Since reported fair shares are likely to be biased by material
elf-interest, this mechanism is expected to be highly efﬁcient. Thus, comparing its performance to that of the Impartial
ivision Rule potentially gives information about the efﬁciency cost of requiring impartiality and about who pays this cost.
Finally, we test – in some additional sessions – a fourth mechanism that also gives up impartiality but does not replace it
y a punishment of overly selﬁsh own claims: The Average Division Rule asks each partner to report an evaluation of the own
laim as well as the partners’ claims. The share of a partner implemented by this mechanism is then calculated as the average
f the claims assigned to this partner, implying that the mechanism is fully efﬁcient by design. By having a mechanism in our
omparison that is fully efﬁcient by design but does neither respect impartiality nor impose a punishment for overly selﬁsh
wn claims we intend to assess the importance of imposing one of those two  requirements (in addition to consensuality,
hich is also respected by this mechanism). If agents report their subjective evaluations of claims truthfully even without
uch corrective devices, then this mechanism should perform well because it implements a compromise allocation in this
ase.
The details of our experiment are as follows: First, we  generate a subjective claims problem involving three partners in a
ab experiment. This is done by having subjects perform real effort tasks within different cohorts and earn points depending
n their relative performance within their cohort.9 The points a subject earns are his contribution to the partnership, and
ll three subjects in a partnership earn their points from exerting real effort in a different cohort. This makes it difﬁcult
or subjects to compare their performances. Furthermore, the production function translating individual contributions to
he joint proﬁt is non-linear.10 The joint proﬁt is then distributed among partners with the help of the above-mentioned
echanisms.
None of these mechanisms has been tested in lab experiments before. In the present study, we compare them in terms
f efﬁciency and fairness. The efﬁciency comparison refers to the fraction of S that is ﬁnally paid out to the partners.11 As
8 The authors also show that for more than three agents, there is a family of division rules satisfying these two properties, which are also efﬁcient. Thus,
y  investigating the special case of three agents, we test this mechanism under adverse conditions regarding efﬁciency.
9 We let subjects acquire their contributions to the cake in real effort tasks to induce strong entitlements. Numerous empirical studies conﬁrm that
arned  rights induce stronger entitlements than those acquired by luck (see e.g. Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Burrows and Loomes, 1994; Schokkaert and
agrou, 1983).
10 We let partners acquire their points in different cohorts and apply a non-linear production function in order to increase the likelihood of inducing
onﬂicting subjective evaluations of claims.
11 While one may reject a mechanism for the sole reason that it performs badly in terms of efﬁciency, one cannot recommend a mechanism in this context
nly  because it is highly efﬁcient. For instance, a mechanism that allocates the entire cake to one partner is maximally efﬁcient, but it is probably considered
ather  unfair by most of the partners.
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to the fairness comparison, we use three different yardsticks: First, before introducing the mechanisms, subjects are asked
in a hypothetical fairness question what they consider a fair way  to divide the cake. The answers to this fairness question
shall serve as a ﬁrst yardstick for the evaluation of the allocations produced by the three mechanisms. A second yardstick is
subjects’ evaluation of the mechanisms’ procedural fairness, which is elicited after subjects have been exposed to the three
division procedures but before they receive feedback about their payoffs. The third yardstick we use in our comparison is
subjects’ evaluation of the mechanisms’ allocative fairness, which requires them to compare the actual outcomes of the
three mechanisms.
Our results clearly show that the two mechanisms which explicitly force agents to assess the partners’ claims and which
do not provide obvious incentives to inﬂate the own claim – that is, the Impartial Division Rule and the Extended Divide-
the-Dollar Rule – yield outcomes that are closer to subjects’ fairness evaluations. The Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule that uses
only agents’ own claims as input is not only worse in terms of fairness, but due to its rule of imposing a ﬁne when the sum
of claims exceeds the available cake size, it is also far less efﬁcient. The Average Division Rule is fully efﬁcient by design, but
performs rather badly in terms of procedural and allocative fairness, since it provides strong incentives to inﬂate the own
claim and systematically disadvantages partners who try to implement a fair allocation.
2. Mechanisms to resolve the subjective claims problem
The subjective claims problem we consider features the three partners A, B, and C, who have jointly produced the cake S,
which now has to be divided amongst them. We  denote the subjective evaluation of claims by partner i by ci = (ciA, ciB, ciC ),
where ci
j
stands for the amount agent j should receive from partner i’s perspective.12 Throughout we  assume that ciA + ciB +
ciC = S for i = A, B, C . Each of the mechanisms we  consider yields an allocation s = (sA, sB, sC), where
∑
isi ≤ S, which we will
evaluate in terms of efﬁciency (in the sense that S −∑isi is minimized) and in terms of allocative and procedural fairness.
The mechanisms we compare differ in the amount and kind of information they process. Suppose the partners are asked to
report their subjective evaluations of claims and denote the report of agent i by mi = (miA, miB, miC ), where m is mnemonic
for message. (Note that if agent i reports truthfully then mi = ci). Then, from partner i’s report, only i’s own  claim, mi
i
, is used
as input in the ﬁrst mechanism considered below; only others’ claims, mi
j
and mi
k
, with {i, j, k} = {A, B, C}, are used in the
second mechanism; and the whole vector of reported claims, mi, is used in the third and fourth mechanism.
2.1. The Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule
Mumy  (1981) proposed a mechanism where each agent i is asked to report only the own  claim mi
i
and where the amount
agent i receives is given by
si = mii − max
⎧⎨
⎩a
⎛
⎝∑
j
mj
j
− S
⎞
⎠ , 0
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
where a > 1. In words, if the sum of reported own claims does not exceed S, then each agent receives exactly the reported own
claim. Otherwise each agent receives the reported own claim minus a ‘ﬁne’ that is proportional to the difference between
the sum of reported own claims and the available amount. Note that there are two sources of inefﬁciencies under this
mechanism. One arises when the sum of reported own  claims exceeds S, while the other arises when this sum falls short
of S. Both kinds of inefﬁciencies increase linearly in the difference between the sum of reported own  claims and the sum of
money available. As for the theoretical prediction, it is far from trivial to see what it would be for the case where agents are
not only interested in their own material payoff but also in the fairness of the ﬁnal allocation as we assume in this paper,
since it depends on the exact shape of agents’ preferences and their belief about the partners’ preferences in that case. In
order to keep things tractable, we refer here and in the following only to the theoretical benchmark for the case where it is
common knowledge that all agents are exclusively interested in their own monetary payoff.13 Under this assumption, any
combination of reports such that
∑
jm
j
j
= S is an equilibrium under this mechanism.
2.2. The Impartial Division RuleIn the mechanism proposed by DeClippel et al. (2008), each agent is asked to report an evaluation of the relative shares
that the other two agents deserve. That is, for {i, j, k} = {A, B, C} each agent i is asked only how much partner j should get
12 A fully formulated theoretical model would start from the assumption that agents have complete and transitive preferences over all possible allocations,
with  the subjective evaluation of claims ci being agent i’s most preferred allocation. Although our approach implicitly assumes that agents have complete
and  transitive preferences over all possible allocations (otherwise the notion of a most preferred allocation would not be well deﬁned), we  introduce a
notation only for the most preferred allocation because this is the object we elicit experimentally.
13 The selﬁsh benchmark is mentioned for completeness only. Our focus is not on whether subjects’ behaviour in the experiment is consistent with this
benchmark or not, but rather on which outcomes occur and how far they are from subjects’ views of a fair division.
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ompared to partner k . Denoting partner i’s report for the ratio of j’s share to k’s share by ri
jk
(so ri
jk
= mi
j
/mi
k
in the notation
sed before), the Impartial Division Rule yields the following payoffs for the three partners:
sA =
S
1 + rBCA + rCBA
; sB =
S
1 + rACB + rCAB
; sC =
S
1 + rABC + rBAC
.
As is easily seen, under this mechanism an agent’s report has no impact on the own  share – the latter is rather determined
xclusively by the reports of the two partners. This is the impartiality property discussed earlier. Consensuality manifests
tself in the property that if there is a division of S that is consistent with the reported opinions about relative shares, then the
echanism assigns these shares. In this case the whole cake is distributed. Otherwise the rule distributes strictly less than
, and the size of the inefﬁciency increases in the degree of inconsistency of the reported relative shares – see Tidemann and
lassmann (2008) for a discussion.14 As for the theoretical prediction, the assumption of common knowledge about agents’
xclusive interest in own monetary payoffs implies that any combination of reports constitutes an equilibrium for this rule,
s no agent can affect his own share by his report.
.3. The Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule
The third mechanism we include in our comparison was proposed by Brams and Taylor (1994). The authors start with a
etting with publicly known, player-speciﬁc entitlements e = (eA, eB, eC) that sum to the available amount S. The mechanism
roposed for this ‘objective entitlements’ setup asks each agent i to report only the own claim mi
i
. If the sum of reported own
laims does not exceed S, then each agent receives exactly the reported own  claim; otherwise, the partners are given priority
n order of their ‘greed level’ deﬁned by mi
i
− ei, starting with the lowest greed level.15 Relevant for our subjective claims
nvironment is an extended version of this mechanism, where players’ entitlements are endogenously determined. For this
urpose, each player i is now asked to report not only mi
i
, but rather a complete vector mi = (miA, miB, miC ). If own  claims are
easible – in the sense that they sum up to S or less – they are again implemented. If own  claims sum up to more than S, then
his mechanism assigns to each player i a greed level deﬁned as the difference between the reported own  claim, mi
i
, and i’s
ntitlement, which is the average of the claims assigned to i by her two  partners, (mj
i
+ mk
i
)/2. Own claims are then paid out
equentially in ascending order of greed levels up to the point where S is depleted. The only source for inefﬁciencies under
his mechanism are own claims that sum up to less than the cake size S. While Brams and Taylor derive formal results for
everal other variants of the Divide-the-Dollar game, the discussion of this variant remains informal. Own  investigations
under the assumption that agents care only about their own  monetary payoff) reveal that the game induced by this rule
as – in general – no pure-strategy equilibrium and that the existence and properties of mixed strategy equilibria heavily
epend on the size of S and on the grid on S.
.4. The Average Division Rule
One might argue that it is easy to ﬁnd other mechanisms that might outperform the considered ones. A particularly
nteresting candidate (suggested by an anonymous referee) asks each agent i to report a complete vector mi = (miA, miB, miC )
nd then implements for each partner the average reported share. That is, this mechanism yields
si =
mi
i
+ mj
i
+ mk
i
3
or partner i, where {i, j, k} = {A, B, C}. We  refer to this mechanism as the ‘Average Division Rule’. If agents are selﬁsh, they
laim the entire cake for themselves and the implemented allocation is an equal division of the dollar. Alternatively, they
ay express their fairness views in their proposed divisions. Note that while this mechanism is fully efﬁcient by design, it
acks the properties of impartiality (respected by the Impartial Division Rule) and sanctioning greedy demands (the Extended
ivide-the-Dollar Rule and the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule have this property). This makes it well-suited for a comparison
ith the other three mechanisms, as we obtain information regarding the efﬁciency cost of imposing the requirement that
 rule should not induce agents to exaggerate the own  fair share. If agents report their subjective evaluations of claims
ruthfully, the mechanism yields an efﬁcient outcome as a compromise of agents’ reports.
. Experimental design
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree Fischbacher (2007). The experiment consists
f four parts.
Part I: Real effort task and emerging cake size. The real effort task consists of a general knowledge quiz. Prior to the
uiz, subjects are randomly assigned to one of three same-size cohorts and they are informed that (i) each subject in a
14 For more than three agents, DeClippel et al. (2008) characterize a family of adjusted rules that always distribute exactly the available amount.
15 Ties result in an allocation where the shares of those involved in the tie are proportional to their entitlements.
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Table  1
Group compositions in experiment.
Cake size Points # Observations
S A B C Groups SubjectsS = 24 2 2 3 90 270
S  = 36 2 3 4 90 270
S  = 60 3 4 4 90 270
cohort will be exposed to the same set of questions; (ii) each subject in a cohort will receive points depending on her relative
performance (in terms of correctly answered quiz questions within a given time period) within her cohort; (iii) after the
quiz each subject will be assigned to a group of three partners, each coming from a different cohort; (iv) the points a subject
acquires in the quiz will be her contribution to the joint proﬁt of the group; and (v) the joint proﬁt of the group will later be
distributed amongst group members with the help of several procedures, which are all fully paid out. Each cohort consists
of 6 subjects, and the points assigned to subjects are as follows: The two high performers within a cohort (i.e., ranks 1 and
2) are assigned 4 points, the two medium performers (ranks 3 and 4) receive 3 points, and the two low performers (ranks 5
and 6) get 2 points. After the real effort task, subjects are informed about their own  rank within their cohort and the points
they achieved. Then they are assigned to a group consisting of three partners (labelled A, B, C), one from each of the three
cohorts. Upon assignment to a group, subjects are informed about their two  partners’ contributions in points, but not about
their partners’ precise performance or rank within their respective cohort. The points subjects bring into the group enter a
non-linear production function, which determines the size of the cake S to be distributed16:
S = 12 + (pointsA) · (pointsB) · (pointsC)
By using a relative performance measure within cohorts, but selecting the three partners from different cohorts, we intend
to induce conﬂicting subjective evaluations of claims. A division according to the number of contributed points might be
considered unfair because contributions in points are only a noisy signal for the actual performances in the quiz and because
subjects have no possibility to directly compare their own  quiz performance to that of the other two  group members. The
non-linear production function further aggravates the difﬁculty of ﬁnding a fair division.
Groups in the experiment are composed such that we have groups with a small cake size of S = 24, groups with a medium
cake size of S = 36 and groups with a large cake size of S = 60 – see Table 1 for details. Note that with this choice of group
compositions we have groups where two partners contribute the same low number of points, groups in which all partners
have different contributions in points and groups where two  partners have the same high contribution.
Part II: The fairness question. After being informed about their partners’ contributions in points and the resulting cake
size, subjects are privately asked what they consider a fair division of the jointly produced cake. That is, each subject i is asked
to report a vector of his subjective evaluation of claims, mi = (miA, miB, miC ), where the entries have to sum up to S, knowing
that the answer to this question is irrelevant for the earnings in the experiment. The answers to the fairness question shall
serve as one of the benchmarks for our comparison of the cake-division mechanisms in terms of allocative fairness.
Part III: Actual division of the cake. In each experimental session, each group is successively exposed to each of the
three main mechanisms in random order.17 For the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule, the factor a determining the ﬁne in case
reported own claims exceed S is set to 1.1. Group composition and cake size remain constant across mechanisms. In each
case, the mechanism is ﬁrst described and subjects have to answer some control questions to make sure that they understand
how the mechanism works. Then subjects are asked for the necessary input for the mechanism, after which they receive the
description of the next mechanism. Feedback about the allocation implemented by a mechanism is given only at the end of
the experiment (see Part IV below) in order to avoid that the outcome of a mechanism affects subjects’ behaviour for other
mechanisms. All mechanisms are paid off, and for each point earned in the experiment subjects were paid 25 cents.
Part IV: Procedural and allocative fairness. Before subjects receive feedback about their payoffs under the different cake-
division mechanisms, they are asked to rank the mechanisms in terms of procedural fairness. After receiving information
about their payoffs, subjects are asked to rank the allocations implemented by the mechanisms in terms of allocative fairness.
4. Experimental results4.1. Fairness question
One might argue that in a subjective claims problem known fairness standards (apart from the egalitarian norm) should
not play a role for fairness evaluations, since contributions are at least partly inﬂuences by luck, which is often considered
16 All of this information was contained in the instructions, which are displayed in Appendix B (not intended for publication).
17 As already mentioned, in some sessions subjects were successively exposed to four mechanisms, the three main ones and the Average Division Rule.
Note  also that in addition to the three or four mechanisms subjects in all sessions also played a unanimity bargaining procedure. Different bargaining
procedures were tested in different sessions, and the bargaining procedure was always presented after the static mechanisms.
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Table  2
Fairness standards and observed assignments in fairness question.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Fairness standard
Egalitarian Payoffs 8 8 12 12 12 20 20
obs.  in % 42.7 18.8 28.8 15.5 8.8 41.1 25.0
Proportional Payoffs 6.86 10.28 8 12 16 16.36 21.82
obs.  in % 38.3 62.2 26.6 26.6 31.1 15.5 27.2
Liberal  Payoffs 7.43 9.14 9.33 12 14.67 17.10 21.45
obs.  in % 5.5 2.2 4.4 5.5 8.8 27.2 9.4
Observed assignments in fairness question
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Fair  share from others 7.14 8.72 8.61 11.48 14.30 16.00 20.95
Average fair share 7.44 9.10 9.15 11.87 14.99 16.97 21.51
 factor that is irrelevant for fairness perceptions because it is outside the agent’s control. Yet, due to the absence of other
better) benchmarks, it is likely that some known fairness standards serve as anchors for subjective evaluations of claims.18
he upper part of Table 2 displays the allocations implied by three well-known division standards and the relative frequencies
f answers to the fairness question that are consistent with each standard.19 We  refer to the egalitarian standard when S
s distributed equally among the partners, to the proportional standard when shares of S are assigned proportionally to the
oints each partner has contributed, and to the liberal standard when each partner receives an equal share of the ﬁxed part
f the production function and the remainder of S is divided proportionally to the points contributed. Table 2 shows that the
verall consistency of subjects’ answers to the fairness question with common fairness standards is rather low. In particular,
or the cake size of S = 36 – where all contributions are different – only about half of the observed assignments of fair shares
re consistent with one of the standards considered. This conﬁrms our presumption that evaluations of claims are subjective
n our scenario, i.e. it is not clear which standard is of relevance here.
The lower part of Table 2 displays for each contribution type and cake size how much subjects, on average, report as being
air for themselves (‘own fair share’),  what their partners report as being fair for them (‘fair share from others’), and what the
verage fair share for each position is when all three partners’ reported fairness evaluations are included in the calculation
f the average (‘average fair share’).  In calculating these ﬁgures we  pool the data for the two partners who contribute the
ame number of points within a given cake size, since there is no sound basis to differentiate between them (except for the
abel), and since the two-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for equality of distributions shows no signiﬁcant differences.
 ﬁrst lesson we learn from Table 2 is that there is a signiﬁcant self-serving bias in the answers to the fairness question:
he own fair share is signiﬁcantly larger than the fair share from others in all relevant comparisons (paired t-test: p < 0.01
or all contribution types and cake sizes). Own  fair shares also exceed the shares the proportional standard would predict
or almost all types and cake sizes for common signiﬁcance levels. There are two exceptions: Those subjects who bring the
ost points to the partnership report own fair shares below the proportional share in S = 24 (t-test: p < 0.02), and own  fair
hares that are not signiﬁcantly different from what the proportional standard would predict in S = 60 (t-test: p = 0.19). This
bservation is consistent with a taste for a more ‘compressed’ distribution than the one implied by proportionality, i.e.,
ne that implies smaller payoff differences across subjects. This taste for a more compressed distribution can be seen more
learly in the assignments from others, where the self-serving bias does not obliterate part of the effect: Fair shares from
thers are signiﬁcantly different from the proportional standard in most comparisons (t-test: p < 0.01 for all types and cake
izes except for the medium contributor in S = 60, where p < 0.09), and while high and medium contributors are consistently
ssigned less than what proportionality would predict, low contributors are assigned more.Looking at individual data, the self-serving bias manifests itself in the choice of fairness standards – while low contributors
end to report own fair shares that are (roughly) consistent with the egalitarian standard, high contributors tend to report
air shares consistent with the proportional standard.20,21
18 The survey by Karagözoglu (2012) shows how norms of equity and desert inﬂuence bargaining behaviour when agents jointly produce the cake that is
o  be divided. Regarding the self-serving bias in fairness judgements, which is shown in numerous studies when stakes are involved (for ﬁeld experiments
ee  Babcock et al., 1996, for lab experiments see Kagel et al., 1996; Konow, 2000), Konow (2003) notes that “although biases sometimes widen the range
f  predicted outcomes, behaviour still is constrained by fairness”.
19 When counting observations as consistent with a given standard, we  allow for intervals that typically round numbers to the next half unit in case the
tandard does not yield integers. See Appendix A for more details.
20 As Dana et al. (2007) show, the existence of “moral wiggle room” allows subjects to behave self-interestedly while maintaining the illusion of fairness
n  the presence of uncertainty between actions and their resulting outcomes. According to Cappelen et al. (2007), an application of this idea in the context
f  multiple fairness norms is that subjects tend to appeal to the one that beneﬁts them most.
21 Table A.1 in Appendix A displays a related observation: Low contributors frequently report fair shares that assign more to low contributors than what
roportionality predicts, while higher contributors do so to a lesser extent. It is important to note, however, that a considerable fraction of all contribution
ypes  in all cake sizes assign a larger share than the one predicted by the proportional standard to the lowest contributor within their group. This conﬁrms
ur  earlier ﬁnding of a taste for a more compressed distribution than the one implied by proportionality.
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Table  3
Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule: claims, ﬁnes and payoffs.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Claim Mean mi
i
9.06 9.50 11.02 14.21 16.00 19.18 22.54
Median mi
i
8 9 10 12 15 18.75 21
Payoff  Mean si 5.47 6.12 6.40 8.75 10.75 14.24 16.98
Mean si/mii 0.70 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.68 0.78 0.77
Fine 4.43 6.53 5.8
Efﬁciency (in %) 0.71 0.72 0.80∑When mi
i
> S 0.53 0.60 0.72
When
∑
mi
i
< S 0.93 0.92 0.93
Result 1 (Fairness Assessments). Overall, the consistency of subjects’ answers to the fairness question with common fairness
standards is rather low. A self-serving bias is present for all contribution types and cake sizes, and subjects tend to assign more to
the low contributor and less to the high contributor compared to the distribution implied by proportionality.
4.2. Results for the mechanisms
Since the randomized order in which the procedures were presented to subjects showed no effect on the results for
common signiﬁcance levels, we will report pooled data of all sessions for a given procedure.
4.2.1. Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule
The results for the mechanism proposed by Mumy  (1981) are displayed in Table 3. Again, we use pooled data for partners
with the same contribution in points, as the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test shows no difference in the two  distributions. Recall
that only each partner i’s own claim, mi
i
, is elicited by this mechanism.
Mechanism input: Reported own claims respect the ordering of contributions in points (median test: p < 0.001 for all
comparisons of claims with different contributions), but they do not correspond to the proportional standard: While low
contributors ask systematically more than proportionality would predict (WSR and t-test: p < 0.001 for all cake sizes), high
contributors ask less (WSR: p < 0.03 for all cake sizes, only the t-test for S = 36 gives p = 0.5). This corresponds to the preference
for a compressed distribution observed in the fairness question. For high contributors there is no difference between reported
own claim and stated own fair share independent of the cake size. For low contributors, however, reported own claims tend
to be higher than own fair shares in the fairness question (WSR: p < 0.03 and paired t-test: p < 0.001 for S = 24; t-test: p < 0.08
while WSR: p = 0.28 for S = 36), while for medium contributors the sign of this difference depends on the relative position
they take within a cake size. Since stated own fair shares were already found to be self-servingly biased, we can expect from
these mechanism inputs that the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule will suffer from excess claims.
Mechanism output: For all cake sizes, mean payoffs are signiﬁcantly lower than mean claims, as can be seen in Table 3,
and this is true also for pairwise comparison on the individual level (MWU:  p < 0.01 for all types and cake sizes). Payoffs are
thus also lower than what subjects considered their own  fair share in the fairness question, and furthermore, payoffs from
this mechanism are also lower than fair shares assigned from others in the fairness question (WSR: p < 0.001 for all types
and cake sizes). The efﬁciency of this mechanism, i.e. the share of S that is paid out, is rather low – it reaches values between
71% for the small cake size and 80% for the large cake size. While there are two  sources of inefﬁciency, claiming too little
or too much, the latter turns out to be the main culprit for the low payoffs: The sum of claims is lower than the available
amount in less than 25% of cases for all cake sizes, while it is higher in more than 50%. In addition, efﬁciency is considerably
lower with overclaiming compared to underclaiming (see lower part of Table 3).22
Overall, our results suggest that the self-serving bias in fairness evaluations already present in the fairness question is
exacerbated by this mechanism: Subjects tend to report own claims that are higher than own fair shares in the fairness
question, and this results in realized payoffs that are not only lower than reported own  claims, but also lower than the stated
own fair shares and even the fair shares from others in the fairness question.
Result 2 (Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule). The self-serving bias found in the fairness question is exacerbated by the Modiﬁed
Nash-Demand Rule: Subjects tend to report own claims that are at least as high as stated own fair shares. This results in an excess
sum of own claims, which, in turn, leads to considerable inefﬁciencies. The second source for inefﬁciencies – claims that sum to
less than the cake size – is empirically less relevant for all cake sizes.
22 Note that to avoid negative payoffs in the experiment, we set a subject’s payoff to zero if mi
i
− a(
∑
j
mj
j
− S) < 0, thus efﬁciency from overclaiming can
be  larger than what the difference between mean sum of claims and total ﬁnes may  suggest.
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Table  4
Impartial Division Rule: reports and payoffs compared to fairness standards.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Observed ri
jk
Mean 0.86 0.99 0.80 0.48 0.66 1.09 0.75
Median 0.67 1 0.75 0.5 0.67 1 0.75
Observed fair ratio 0.84 1.00 0.83 0.60 0.71 1.0 0.76
Proportional 0.67 1 0.75 0.5 0.67 1 0.75
Realized sjk 0.84 1.00 0.80 0.51 0.62 1.06 0.75
Efﬁciency 0.98 0.99 0.99
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is displayed in column i, and sjk is the ratio of j’s to k’s realized payoff share, displayed in column i.
.2.2. Impartial Division Rule
Recall that this mechanism asks each agent i only for an evaluation of the partners’ relative shares, ri
jk
= mi
j
/mi
k
for {i, j,
} = {A, B, C}, which makes it ‘impartial’. While there exist impartial and efﬁcient rules for dividing a cake for any number
 > 3 of agents, in the special case of three agents the rule distributes the entire cake only if the reported relative shares are
onsistent; otherwise it distributes strictly less.23 Thus, besides the main question how well this mechanism performs in
erms of procedural and allocative fairness, it is also interesting to see whether efﬁciency is an issue in the case of three
gents.
Mechanism input: Table 4 displays the elicited relative shares ri
jk
as well as the respective ratios implied by subjects’
nswers to the fairness question (observed fair ratio) and the ratios implied by the proportional standard. Subjects’ reports
or ri
jk
reveal a consensus on assigning equal shares for equal contributions (87% in S = 60 and 94% in S = 24 assign ratio 1 : 1
hen partners have the same contribution). With different contributions, the median of ri
jk
corresponds precisely to the
atio implied by the proportional standard for each role in each cake size, and for medium and high contributors the mean
f ri
jk
is also not signiﬁcantly different from the ratio derived from the proportional standard. Only low contributors assign
ess to higher contributors than what their relative payoff according to the proportional standard would be, both in the
edium and in the large cake size (WSR: p < 0.01).24 Overall, in the small and large cake size, the observed ri
jk
does not differ
igniﬁcantly from the observed fair ratio for any contribution type. This means that subjects’ reports in the Impartial Division
echanism do not deviate substantially from their evaluations of claims stated in the fairness question, which we interpret
s their true subjective evaluations of claims. Only for the cake size of S = 36, the medium and the high contributors assign
ore to the high and less to the low contributors compared to what they stated in the observed fair ratio (both WSR  and
-test are signiﬁcant at p < 0.05), and are thus more consistent with the proportional standard. Low contributors here also
end to reduce payoff differences, which again reﬂects their observed fair ratio.
Mechanism output: As Table 4 shows, realized payoff ratios under this mechanism are rather close to reported input
atios (the ratio of j’s to k’s payoff share, sj/sk, is displayed in partner i’s cell of the respective cake size): The WSR  cannot
eject that the mechanism implements results that are not signiﬁcantly different from subjects’ reports for all cake sizes.
s a result, the comparisons above between mechanism inputs and proportional standard also hold for realized payoffs.
egarding the comparison between realized payoff ratios and observed fair ratios in the fairness question, the mechanism
ields good results: There are no signiﬁcant differences for the large and small cake size; only for the medium cake size, low
ontributors are disadvantaged compared to the observed fair ratios in the fairness question.
Comparing the absolute size of realized payoffs to the respective assignments from the fairness question (see Fig. A.1 in
ppendix A), we ﬁnd that the Impartial Division Rule implements absolute payoffs that are between the own  fair share and
he fair share from others in the fairness question. This seems justiﬁed, considering the self-serving bias in the answers to
he fairness question. A mechanism that performs well in a subjective claims problem needs to take such a bias into account.
urthermore, the Impartial Division Rule is highly efﬁcient, paying out over 98% of all cake sizes. Asking whether deviations
rom the observed fair ratio would bring about changes in the mechanism’s efﬁciency, we  ﬁnd that this is not the case for
he medium and large cake size. In the small cake size, there is some efﬁciency loss due to the deviation of actual reports
rom those elicited in the fairness question (WSR: p < 0.05), the difference in means is only 0.006%, though. Overall, this
echanism gives good incentives to report true evaluations of others – assuming that those elicited in the fairness question
re true. This and the property that it avoids self-evaluations seem to be the main strengths of the mechanism. A possible
eakness is the fairly intransparent payoff rule which does not easily reveal the consequences of changing the own  report
n assigned shares.
23 The reports of the three partners are consistent iff rC
AB
= rB
AC
/rA
BC
.
24 Two outliers of rB
AC
= 50 are excluded from reported descriptive statistics for S = 24 in Table 4. Including them would yield a mean reported ratio of 1.4
or  the low contributors and give a distorted picture of the results.
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Table  5
Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule: reports and payoffs compared to fairness question results.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Own claim 8.49 9.8 11.06 12.77 15.22 19.30 22.15
Entitlement 7.08 8.4 9.09 11.83 13.55 17.21 20.49
Greed  level 1.42 1.41 1.98 0.95 1.67 2.08 1.66
Own  fair share 8.04 9.90 10.22 12.64 16.36 18.91 22.65
Fair share from others 7.14 8.72 8.61 11.48 14.30 16.00 20.95
Payoff  7.31 8.95 9.25 12.07 13.84 16.93 21.05
Efﬁciency 0.98 0.97 0.98
Result 3 (Impartial Division Rule). By eliciting relative shares of the partners, the Impartial Division Rule avoids the self-
serving bias, and reported shares are mostly in line with the proportional standard and also with the ratios of subjects’ stated
fair shares for others. Realized absolute payoffs are between the own fair share and the fair share from others, thus representing
elicited subjective claims from the fairness question. Furthermore, the mechanism is highly efﬁcient implying that there is hardly
an efﬁciency cost of requiring impartiality.
4.2.3. Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule
In the mechanism proposed by Brams and Taylor, each partner i is asked to report an mi = (miA, miB, miC ). This makes
it particularly well-suited for a comparison with the results from the fairness question, as they both ask for precisely the
same information. Table 5 displays own claims, entitlements, greed levels and payoffs for this mechanism, as well as the
corresponding reports from the fairness question as comparison.25
Mechanism input: Subjects’ own claims differ signiﬁcantly from their entitlements (WSR: p < 0.01 for each comparison),
which implies a greed level different from zero for all contribution types and cake sizes (see Appendix A for more details).
Since partners are paid out their claims in ascending order of their greed level and the greed level is calculated as the difference
between own claim and own entitlement, the mechanism incorporates an incentive to act strategically. On the one hand,
an agent might report a low claim for a partner, which decreases his entitlement and thus increases his greed – holding
everything else constant. This makes it more likely that one’s claim is fully paid off, as one’s own greed is comparatively
lower when that of others increases, and partners with lower greed levels get paid off ﬁrst. If, on the other hand, a subject
reduces his own claim, this increases the chance of being fully paid off (since the own  greed level decreases), however, at
the cost of receiving a lower amount when the subject gets paid off (since payoffs correspond at most to own claims).
In Appendix A we report on observed behaviour that is consistent with any of the strategic incentives described. Overall,
we ﬁnd that for each cake size, the partner with the highest contribution in a given partnership gets systematically disad-
vantaged by a lower entitlement (WSR: p < 0.01 and t-test: p < 0.01 for type C in S = 36; WSR: p < 0.07 and t-test: p < 0.03 for
type C in S = 24; and WSR: p < 0.03 and t-test: p < 0.01 for pooled types B and C in S = 60). Lower contributors, on the other
hand, receive entitlements at least as high as the fair shares from others in the fairness question. These tendencies are fully
in line with the strategic incentives described earlier: Shifting the assignment from high to low contributors increases the
chance that the latter advance in the order partners are paid off, but they take away a smaller share of the cake than anyone
else would. Therefore, reducing the entitlements of higher contributors and increasing those of lower contributors serves
the same purpose.
Mechanism output: As can be seen in Table 5, ﬁnal payoffs in this mechanism are always smaller than own claims (WSR:
p < 0.01 for all types and cake sizes). This is due to the observed self-serving bias in own  claims and its consequence that
not all claims are paid off when the sum of own claims exceeds the total amount available. Only for medium contributors in
S = 36 this difference is small, as 82 out of 90 subjects receive the full own  claim. The high own claims also imply that most
of the time the full cake size is allocated, which can be seen in the high efﬁciency of this mechanism: for all cake sizes, 97%
or more of the available amount is paid off.
Regarding the fairness of the implemented allocation, we ﬁrst note that the payoffs of partners with the same contribution
level within a partnership do not differ (MWU:  p > 0.6 for low contributors in S = 24, MWU:  p > 0.3 for high contributors in
S = 60). For all contributions in all cake sizes, realized payoffs are below own  fair shares as stated in the fairness question
(WSR: p < 0.03 for all comparisons). Comparing each type’s payoff to the fair share from others in the fairness question, we
ﬁnd that all types in the small cake size get a slightly higher average payoff than what others think is fair, but the difference
is not signiﬁcant. For S = 36, the low and medium contributor get a signiﬁcantly higher payoff than the fair share from others
(t-test: p < 0.01); the high contributor’s mean payoff is smaller, but the difference is not signiﬁcant (WSR: p = 0.17 and t-test:
p = 0.11). For S = 60, the medium contributor gets signiﬁcantly more (t-test: p < 0.01), while the two  high contributors receive
about what others thought was fair for them.
25 Remember that the ‘entitlement’ of partner i is the average of the two  partners’ evaluations of i’s claim.
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Table  6
Average Rule: reports and payoffs compared to fairness question.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Own  claim 14.21 16.31 15.93 21.18 21.43 36.37 38.52
Assignment from others 4.24 5.12 5.43 9.13 10.12 9.04 12.12
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aPayoff  7.57 8.85 8.93 13.16 13.89 18.15 20.92
Own  fair share 8.40 10.31 9.56 13.68 17.43 19.02 22.84
Average fair share 7.57 8.87 8.43 12.12 15.43 16.10 21.96
Overall, we see that high contributors’ disadvantage due to lower entitlements and lower own  claims carries over to
heir payoffs in this mechanism – they are the only ones who  systematically receive an amount comparable to what others
hink is fair for them, while others receive more. Fig. A.2 in Appendix A displays by how much realized payoffs differ from
wn fair shares as well as from fair shares from others as reported in the fairness question. Comparing realized payoffs to
he discussed fairness standards, we ﬁnd that all types in all cake sizes receive a payoff that is signiﬁcantly different from
hat the egalitarian and proportional standard would imply. Unique exception is the medium contributor in S = 36 whose
ayoff is not signiﬁcantly different from 12 (which, as already discussed, also corresponds to the payoff implied by other
istribution standards).
esult 4 (Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule). Subjects claim more for themselves than what their partners think they are
ntitled to under the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule. This makes the mechanism highly efﬁcient. Entitlements assigned by the
artners are systematically lower for high contributors and higher for low contributors compared to the fair shares from others.
his distortion is carried over to payoffs, leading to a disadvantage of high contributors.
.2.4. Average Division Rule
Our three main mechanisms have in common that they either have a built-in punishment for overly greedy demands
the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule and the Extended Divide-the Dollar Rule have this property) or are impartial by design (as
he Impartial Division Rule). A possible downside of each of them is that they yield efﬁciency losses in case of disagreement.
he Average Division Rule is located at the other end of the spectrum. It has neither a punishment for greedy demands nor
s it impartial, but it is fully efﬁcient by design. It is therefore interesting to see how the Average Division Rule compares to
he other mechanisms. To address this question, we tested this rule in some additional sessions with 144 subjects in total.
Table 6 displays the results of the Average Division Rule and how they compare to those from the fairness question. As in
he main experiment, the results from the fairness questions display a self-serving bias for all contribution types, as can be
een in the last two rows of the table. Turning to mechanism inputs, we observe that only about one quarter of our subjects
ake entirely selﬁsh claims. Claims are nevertheless extremely biased towards material self-interest: Even if we  exclude
ll subjects with entirely selﬁsh claims, the remaining subjects’ own  demands are signiﬁcantly larger than own  fair shares
s stated in the fairness questions (WSR test signiﬁcant at common levels for all contribution types and cake sizes).
Compared to the reported ratios under the Impartial Division Rule, subjects’ assignments to the two  partners is dampened
n the Average Division Rule in the sense that when partners contribute a different amount of points to the cake size, the
ower contributor receives more and the higher contributor receives less than under the Impartial Division Rule. This may
e due to the fact that subjects’ focus under the Average Division Rule is largely on own  demands, and less emphasis is put
n a fair evaluation of the partners. Compared to the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule, the shares assigned by an agent to
he two partners are signiﬁcantly smaller under the Average Division Rule (WSR test signiﬁcant at common levels for all
omparisons). This might be due to the fact that the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule reduces the self-serving bias through
reed-based sanctions, while the Average Division Rule does not sanction selﬁsh claims. On the other hand, observed claims
nder the Average Division Rule are not sufﬁciently selﬁsh so that the average of all three claims would induce an equal
ivision. The result is a distorted division with large shares for subjects who act selﬁshly, and small shares for those who
isplay some concern for others in their reported assignment. This also implies a considerably larger variance in the payoffs
ompared to the other mechanisms (see Fig. A.3 in Appendix A). If the average fair share is used as a yardstick for a fair
utcome, we ﬁnd that payoffs from the Average Division Rule display a larger absolute deviation from this benchmark than
hose from the Impartial Division Rule and the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule (WSR: p < 0.01 for each contribution type).
esult 5 (Average Division Rule). A simple mechanism in which each partner reports a division and the average is implemented
eads to a distorted division with large shares for subjects who make very selﬁsh claims and small shares for subjects who  include
heir fairness ideas into their reported division..3. Comparison of procedural and allocative fairness
In this subsection we ﬁrst compare the three main mechanisms in terms of subjects’ ex-post evaluation of the procedural
nd allocative fairness. Then we discuss the results from the sessions where all four mechanisms have been tested.
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Fig. 1. Mean ranks of mechanisms’ procedural fairness by cake size.Fig. 2. Mean ranks of mechanisms’ allocative fairness by cake size.
4.3.1. Comparison of main mechanisms
Before knowing their payoffs, subjects were asked to rank the mechanisms in terms of procedural fairness. Fig. 1 shows
the mean rank that each contribution type in a given cake size assigns to each mechanism for its procedural fairness: The
Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule is ranked worse than the others in most cases, while there is mostly no signiﬁcant difference
in the mean rank between the Impartial Division Rule and the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule. Indicating the signiﬁcance
level of 5% for a Wilcoxon signed-rank test by ** and the level of 1% by ***, the following relations hold: Extended Divide-the-
Dollar Rule = Impartial Division Rule *** Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule for all contribution types and all cake sizes except for
the medium contributor in the large cake size and the low contributor in the medium cake size, for whom we  have Extended
Divide-the-Dollar Rule ** Impartial Division Rule = Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule. Thus, when considering only the three
main mechanisms, the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule is seen as best with respect to procedural fairness by subjects when
they do not know which allocations the rules ﬁnally implement.
After being informed about their payoff from each mechanism, subjects were asked to rank the mechanisms according to
the fairness of outcomes. Fig. 2 displays the results of subjects’ view on the allocative fairness of the three main mechanisms.
Here we see that the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule again is ranked last for all comparisons while the preference in the
comparison Impartial Division Rule versus Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule depends on subjects’ contribution type. The
following relations hold: Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule = Impartial Division Rule *** Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule for
all types in S = 24, for the high and medium contributor in S = 36 and for the medium contributor in S = 60. For the high
contributor in the large cake size we ﬁnd Impartial Division Rule *** Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule *** Modiﬁed Nash-
Demand Rule, while for the low contributor in S = 36 we  ﬁnd Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule *** Impartial Division Rule
= Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule. The Impartial Division Rule might have looked slightly less appealing when judged only in
terms of procedural fairness as one cannot state own  claims, and only relative evaluations of others are possible. However,
after seeing the allocation this mechanism produces, it moves upwards in the ranking of agents in the large cake size, while
for all other types its ranking does not change. The Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule probably has more intuitive appeal,
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ut its potential for strategic behaviour, which harms high contributors in our experiment, makes its allocations less fair for
hese partners in the end.
.3.2. Results from sessions testing all mechanisms
Looking at the data of the sessions where subjects were exposed to four mechanisms – the three main mechanisms and
he Average Division Rule – we observe that the relative ranking of the three main mechanisms is very similar to that in
he main comparison above – see Fig. A.4 in the Appendix for details. Regarding the Average Division Rule we  observe that
t performs rather poorly in terms of procedural fairness for the low and the medium contributor. The mechanism’s rating
hen decreases further for all contribution types after subjects are informed about the outcomes and evaluate the allocative
airness of the mechanisms: The Average Division Rule fares worse than both the Impartial Division Rule and the Extended
ivide-the-Dollar Rule in terms of distributional fairness for all contribution types and all cakes sizes (WSR: p < 0.01). It is
anked higher than the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule, which remains the worst performer in all comparisons.
esult 6 (Procedural and Allocative Fairness). While the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule ranks slightly better in terms of
rocedural fairness, the Impartial Division Rule gains when considering allocative fairness. The Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule is
anked consistently worse than the others in both comparisons. In sessions where the Average Division Rule was included in the
omparison, it ranks worse than both the Impartial Division Rule and the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule, but better than the
odiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule with respect to both fairness measures.
. Conclusion
Different cake-division mechanisms have been compared experimentally in terms of fairness and efﬁciency in a subjective
laims problem involving three agents. All mechanisms use reported subjective evaluations of claims as input and yield
nique shares summing up to no more than the value of the cake as output. The mechanisms differ in the amount of
nformation they process: The Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule (Mumy,  1981) only requires each partner’s own  claim as input,
he Impartial Division Rule (DeClippel et al., 2008) asks for each agent’s assessment of her partners’ relative claims, and
he Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule (Brams and Taylor, 1994) requires each partner’s assessment of her own as well as the
artners’ claims. While under the Impartial Division Rule no partner can affect his own share regardless of what he reports,
nder the other two mechanisms the reported own claim potentially has an impact on the own  share. To avoid excessively
reedy reported own claims, these mechanisms punish agents when the sum of reported own claims exceeds the available
ake size. The Average Division Rule tested in some additional sessions uses the same input as the Extended Divide-the-
ollar Rule but has no built-in punishment for overly selﬁsh claims. On the positive side, this mechanism is efﬁcient by
esign.
We found that the Modiﬁed Nash-Demand Rule performs rather badly, since the considerable self-serving bias – i.e.
he difference between what subjects consider fair for themselves and what others think is their fair share – implies that
ot the entire amount available is paid out. This is mainly due to the mechanism’s built-in ﬁne that is intended to deter
gents from reporting too high own claims. The Impartial Division Rule and the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule perform
igniﬁcantly better in terms of efﬁciency, as at most 2-3% of the cake is not allocated. They also rank high in terms of
erceived procedural and allocative fairness. The relative ranking of these two  mechanisms depends on the relative position
f the evaluating partner in terms of contribution to the cake. While low contributors typically prefer the Extended Divide-
he-Dollar Rule, high contributors tend to prefer the Impartial Division Rule. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that low
ontributors are systematically advantaged and high contributors disadvantaged by the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule. The
verage Division Rule tested in some additional sessions is efﬁcient by design. However, it ranks low in terms of procedural
nd allocative fairness, mainly because subjects who  try to implement their fairness ideas are systematically disadvantaged.
Overall, we think that the Impartial Division Rule in particular deserves high attention in this type of division problem for
hree reasons: First, no partner is systematically disadvantaged by this mechanism; second, its property of impartiality (own
hares are only determined by others’ reports, and one can only report evaluations of others) and the relative (rather than
bsolute) evaluation it requires make it less susceptible to the self-serving bias; and third, the mechanism’s high efﬁciency
mplies that the efﬁciency cost of impartiality is rather low.
The ubiquitous self-serving bias also explains the ﬁndings of our companion study (Gantner et al., 2013) on the per-
ormance of three unanimity bargaining procedures to resolve the same subjective claims problem: A procedure that only
equires agents to state their own demand has a disadvantage for the last mover, as little is left for him after the other two
layers make their demands. Bargaining procedures which force agents to consider the entire vector of claims turn out to
e closer to subjects’ own fairness assessments, and also to assessments of impartial spectators expressed in a vignette.
While bargaining may  seem a natural way to resolve the subjective claims problem, our companion paper shows that
ll bargaining protocols considered lead to inefﬁciencies. By contrast, as the present paper has shown, a carefully chosen
tatic mechanism implements a fair allocation at almost no efﬁciency loss. The fact that a well designed static mechanism
 such as the Impartial Division Rule – outperforms the best bargaining protocol in our comparison in terms of effciency
s a remarkable result, especially in light of the fact that our experiments involve only three players. Indeed, we would
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expect the relative advantage of static over dynamic procedures to increase in the number of players.26 Since the high-
stake environments in the motivating examples typically involve at least three parties, and since in these examples each
percentage point of difference in efﬁciency corresponds to a large dollar amount, investigating how the relative performance
of static over dynamic procedures changes in the number of players seems a fruitful area for future research.
Appendix A.
A.1. Additional results
Fairness question. The table below presents the results of the fairness question in more detail. When counting observa-
tions as consistent with a given standard, we allow for intervals that typically round numbers to the next half unit in case
the standard does not yield integers. 27 These intervals are given in the ‘adjusted’ row. Furthermore, we report the observed
relative frequencies of some intuitive criteria such as assigning equal shares to equal contributions, or shares that reﬂect the
contribution ordering.28
Table A.1
More fairness standards and observed assignments.
Cake size S = 24 S = 36 S = 60
Partner A/B C A B C A B/C
Contribution 2 3 2 3 4 3 4
Fairness standard
Egalitarian 8 8 12 12 12 20 20
Proportional 6.86 10.28 8 12 16 16.36 21.82
Adjusted [6.5, 7] [10, 11] 8 12 16 [16, 17) (21.5, 22]
Liberal 7.43 9.14 9.33 12 14.67 17.10 21.45
Adjusted (7, 7.5] [9, 9.5] [9, 9.5] 12 [14.5, 15] [17, 18] [21, 21.5]
Observations consistent with fairness standard (in %)
Equal shares to equal contributions 90.5 96.6 – 98.8 89.4
Reﬂects contribution ordering 47.2 38.8 62.2 75.5 80.0 53.3 64.4
Low  contributor gets more than proportional 50.5 23.3 66.6 53.3 41.1 73.3 38.3
Impartial Division Rule. Fig. A.1 compares the absolute size of realized payoffs from the Impartial Division Rule to the
Fig. A.1. Fairness and impartial division mechanism.
respective assignments from the fairness question. This mechanism implements absolute payoffs that are between the own
fair share and the fair share from others in the fairness question.
Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule. Fig. A.2 compares the absolute size of realized payoffs from the Extended Divide-the-
Dollar Rule to the respective assignments from the fairness question.
26 See e.g. Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000), and Cai (2000) for theoretical work, or Cadigan et al. (2009) for an experimental study on the so-called holdout
problem, a situation in which the required agreement by multiple parties creates an incentive for individual strategic delay in order to capture a larger
share  of the surplus.
27 Sometimes the interval is larger. For instance, for S = 24 the proportional standard predicts 6.86 for the two low contributors and 10.28 for the medium
contributor. If we  count an observation of 6.5 for the low contributors as consistent with this standard, this would leave 11 for the medium contributor,
therefore we  consider observations in the interval [10,11] as consistent with the proportional standard for this type. This is certainly an ad-hoc criterion,
however, we tried various other criteria, such as allowing for a ﬁxed deviation in both directions of a point prediction, and results are rather stable.
28 Here we  refer to the strict ordering, i.e. the egalitarian standard would not reﬂect contribution ordering in our deﬁnition, as higher contributions are
not  rewarded with higher shares.
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Fig. A.2. Fairness and Extended Divide-the-Dollar mechanism.
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Greed levels: Overall, greed levels in the Extended Divide-the-Dollar Rule do not depend on subjects’ contributions towards
he cake (WSR: p = 0.49 for the comparison between low vs. medium contributor in S = 24; p = 0.7 for low vs. high contributor
n S = 36 ; and p = 0.8 for medium vs. high contributor in S = 60). Only exception is the medium contributor in S = 36: his
reed level is signiﬁcantly lower than the low contributor’s (WSR: p < 0.02 and t-test: p < 0.03) and also lower than the high
ontributor’s (WSR: p = 0.12 and t-test: p < 0.09). This is probably due to the fact that only for this type all fairness standards
iscussed above point towards the same allocation of 12. In the experiment, 2/3 of all subjects in this role claimed precisely
his amount, and also 2/3 of all subjects in this role were assigned an entitlement of 12 or more from their partners, which
xplains the low greed level.
Strategic behaviour: Claims and stated own fair shares do not differ signiﬁcantly for low contributors in the small cake size
nd for medium contributors in all cake sizes, suggesting that these types tend to submit truthful reports of their evaluation
f own claims. High contributors, on the other hand, systematically claim less than their stated own fair share (WSR: p < 0.05
nd t-test: p < 0.03 for S = 36 ; WSR: p < 0.01 and t-test: p < 0.01 for S = 60), which can be interpreted as an attempt to lower
heir greed levels. But, we also ﬁnd that low contributors in the medium cake size claim more than they stated as own  fair
hare (WSR: p < 0.05 and t-test: p < 0.03), which would – ceteris paribus – imply higher greed levels. Knowing that there
as a signiﬁcant self-serving bias in the fairness question, one might expect that reporting even higher own  claims would
urther increase these subjects’ greed. However, payoffs ﬁnally depend on relative greed levels. We  thus need to check
hether low contributors systematically assign smaller entitlements to a certain type compared to what they assigned to
hem as fair share. This would mean that they try to compensate high reports of their own claim by actively increasing some
ther partner’s greed level. In fact, low contributors (partner A) in the medium cake size do precisely that – they assign
lightly more to partner B, and considerably less to C (t-test: p < 0.001) compared to what they stated as fair for each of these
artners. Note that the disadvantaged partner C is the high contributor, who would take away a large share of the cake in
ase he gets paid off ﬁrst. In comparison, the high contributor C has some extra amount to allocate between his partners
ompared to the fairness question, since his own claim under this mechanism is lower than his stated own fair share in the
airness question. C allocates this extra amount by reporting, on average, 0.4 more for the medium contributor compared to
hat he assigned to B in the fairness question, and 0.8 more to the low contributor. This might be interpreted as a strategic
ove, too, as C would prefer B to be the last one being paid off, since B takes away more than A from the cake. Consistent
ith this strategic reasoning is also what we ﬁnd for S = 60: Both high contributors report, on average, 0.7 more for the low
ontributor than for their fellow high-contribution partner (t-test: p < 0.03 for B, and p < 0.1 for C).
Average Rule. Fig. A.3 shows that the Average Rule leads to much larger standard deviations in payoffs compared to the
mpartial Division Rule.
36 A. Gantner, R. Kerschbamer / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 131 (2016) 21–36Fig. A.4. Mean ranks of all mechanisms’ procedural (left) and allocative (right) fairness.
Fig. A.4 shows a comparison of the procedural and allocative fairness for the data of the additional treatment including
all four mechanism.
Appendix B. Experimental Instructions
Experimental instructions associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
j.jebo.2016.07.019.
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